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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
EQUITY
In Deibel v. Wilson1 recognition was given to the long established
principle that injunction is an extraordinary remedy not to be granted
unless the proof is clear and convincing. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the
construction, by defendant, of a building which would contain defendant's
home and the office for his practice as physician. Defendant com-
menced construction only after a Board of Zoning adjustment had ordered
the building inspector to issue a permit. Later, request for an injunction
was made by neighboring property owners and a temporary restraining
order issued. The court found that construction of such building was
not prohibited by the zoning ordinances. The decision also stated that
there were strong equities in defendant's favor: that he began construction
upon the advice of administrative agencies that he had the right to do
so; that the facts suggest a strong case for variance within the terms of
the zoning ordinance; that the evidence establishes that the structure will
enhance the value of the surrounding property; and that defendant
had invested a substantial sum of money, even though at some risk be-
cause of the pendency of a suit for injunction though no order prevent-
ing construction was outstanding. The plaintiff's claim for an injunction
was also based upon a deed restriction against "use" of the property for
other than residential structures. The court rejected this claim because
the restriction would shortly expire, possibly even before construction was
complete and, second, because a restriction on "use" does not justify an
injunction against construction of a building which, because of the nature
of the construction, could be put to the prohibited use.
Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber2 considered the right of a former
employer to enforce, by injunction, the provisions of a contract by which
a former employee agreed not to work for a competitor in an area of nine-
teen states for a term of five years after the termination of employment.
The specific restrictive provisions of the contract were found to be en-
forceable since they were no wider than reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of the employer's business and did not impose undue hardship on
the employee. The employer was held to be reasonably entitled to in-
junctive relief when the record showed that "special knowledge, experi-
ence and skill" gained by the employee in his confidential relationship
while working for the employer were utilized in the manufacture by
the new competing employer of equipment which was sold to former
customers of the plaintiff employer. It should be noted that in the
1. 150 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
2. 104 Ohio App. 8, 146 N.E.2d 447 (1957).
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present case there was evidence which established use of confidential
knowledge and skill in the actual sale of equipment to customers of the
plaintiff. Is the restrictive covenant by which the employee agrees not
to work for competitors enforceable when he goes to work for a com-
petitor, or is actual use of this knowledge to injure the competitive posi-
tion of the employer, or at least the immediate threat of use, necessary?
This is left unanswerable by the court.
A common pleas court appointed special master commissioners in
investigating generally the unauthorized practice of law in the county 'in
which that court sat. The commissioners subpoenaed a person, allegedly
licensed as a consultant before the Industrial Commission of Ohio and the
Bureau of Workman's Compensation of Ohio, to appear and -bring certain
records. In Lattin v. McMillen? the person subpoenaed sought an injunc-
tion against the commissioners on the ground that the appointment of
the commissioners was contrary to law and that the hearings before the
commissioners were not conducted according to proper procedure. The
trial court found that certain procedures were improper; jouralized an
order to correct such improprieties; and dismissed the injunction. On
appeal, it was held that since the appointment of the commissioners was
basically a proper manner for the trial court to proceed and that since the
faulty procedure had been corrected, the request for an injunction had
become a moot question. Consequently, the dismissal of the injunction
was affirmed.
In Wayne Lakes Park v. Warner4 plaintiff maintained a lake and
park and sold lots adjacent thereto for private ownership. Defendant
bought one of these lots by a deed which contained the provision that
"the owner . . . shall, at all times, maintain an annual membership in
Wayne Lakes Park operated by the grantor... ." Defendant refused to
maintain his membership. Plaintiff sought to restrain defendant from
occupying the demised premises during the time that membership was not
maintained. The court refused to use the injunctive process for this
purpose. No penalty was provided for failure to maintain the member-
ship and there was no mention of forfetiture or right of re-entry or other
remedy upon which the injunction prayed for might be based. Because
of this the court found that the grantor had failed to establish with
reasonable clarity that maintenance of membership was a condition of
retention of ownership. "Forfeitures are not favored, so that, in case
of doubt, questionable provisions will be construed as covenants rather
than as conditions." The court recognizes the right of a grantor to estab-
lish a general building scheme or plan for the development of a tract or
3. 104 Ohio App. 449, 150 N.F.2d 84 (1958).
4. 104 Ohio App. 167, 147 N.E.2d 269 (1957).
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subdivision, but held that rights of this type were not in litigation here.
Consequently, the injunctive process was not available for the protection
of the "covenant" which the grantor had obtained.
In a land contract in which the purchase price was to be paid monthly
over a period of several years and vendor, in case of default, had the right
to declare the contract void, it was held, in Economy Savings and Loan
Co. V. Hollington,5 that the vendor was not required to enforce an equita-
ble mortgage on the property, but could recover the property which would
allow him the increase in the value of the property.
Kellogg v. Board of County Commissioners" held that, when peti-
tioners filed a petition for an injunction which was positively verified and
at the same time filed a motion for a temporary injunction, the petition
served the purpose of an affidavit supporting the motion.
In Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n v. DriscollT the prede-
cessor of the plaintiff in developing a suburban tract of land, had duly
recorded a declaration of restrictions which recited a number of specific
reservations and restrictions relating to structures which might -be erected
on the property with which the declaration was concerned. It also pro-
vided that no structure could be erected without the written approval of
the developer or his successors. Defendant, with knowledge of the
recorded restriction, purchased a lot within the development and, sub-
sequently, submitted a plan for a house thereon. This plan was rejected
because the garage faced the street. Plaintiff then commenced construc-
tion of the house and garage according to the unapproved plans. De-
fendant sued to enjoin such construction. The court recognized the le-
gality of general building plans for the development of a tract of prop-
erty provided the plans are not against public policy. A developer may
reserve broad powers of modifying restrictions if some standard or cri-
terion is reserved for the exercise of the reserved power. In the present
case, the declaration required that an attached garage conform architec-
turally to the residence and made no reference to the location of the en-
trance to the garage. The court therefore concluded that the reservation
of the power of approval or rejection of a plan by the developer or his
successors was valid provided that it did not add any new or different
restrictions than those set forth in the recorded declaration, and that it
only required plans be submitted for approval to assure that the plans
conformed to the restrictions of record.
In Wiley v. Wiley,8 a husband sued for divorce on the ground of the
5. 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (1957).
6. 153 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
7. 106 Ohio App. 95, 153 N.E.2d 681 (1957).
8. 153 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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